Identifiability. Antony
Flew claims to be willing to allow in principle for the possibility of
miracles. In practice, he argues that the problem of identifying
a miracle is serious, if not insurmountable.
The argument against miracles from unidentifiability may be
summarized:
1. A miracle must be identified (distinguished)
before it can be
known to have occurred.
2. A miracle can be distinguished in one of two
ways: in terms of
nature or in terms of the supernatural.
3. To identify it by reference to the
supernatural as an act of God
begs the question.
4. To identify it in reference to the natural
event robs it of its
supernatural quality.
5. Therefore, miracles cannot be known to have
occurred, since
there is no way to identify them.
Flew insists, against Augustine (see Augustine,
21.8), that if a miracle is merely "a portent [which] is not contrary
to nature, but contrary to our knowledge of nature" (Flew, 348), then
it has no real apologetic value. For, argues Flew, if an event is
merely a miracle in relation to us at present, then it provides
no proof that a revelation it alleges to support is really
beyond the power of nature. Whereas Augustine’s notion of a miracle
would assure the dependence of creation on God, it does so at the cost
of subverting the apologetic value of miracle (ibid.). For if a
miracle is only contrary to our knowledge of nature, then a
miracle is nothing but a natural event. In any event, we could not
know that a miracle has really occurred, only that it seems
to us that one did.
Flew’s point can be stated another way. In order to
identify a miracle within nature, the identification of that miracle
must be in terms of what is independent of nature. But there is no way
to identify a miracle as independent of the natural except by
appealing to a supernatural realm, which begs the question. It argues
in effect: "I know this is a miraculous event in the natural world,
because I know (on some independent basis) that there is a
supernatural cause beyond the natural world."
On the other hand, there is no natural way to
identify a miracle. For unless it is already known (on independent
grounds) that the event is miraculous, then it must be considered to
be another natural event. From the scientific point of view, it is
just "odd" or inconsistent with previously known events. Such an event
should occasion research for a broader scientific law, not
worship.
From this, it would follow that no alleged
miraculous event can be used to prove that a religious system is true.
That is to say, miracles can have no apologetic value. We cannot argue
that God exists because an event is an act of God. For unless we know
that there is a God who can act, we cannot know that an occurrence is
an act of God. The latter cannot prove the former (ibid., 348-49).
If miracles are not identifiable, because there is
no way to define them without begging the question, the reasoning
proceeds:
1. A miracle must be identifiable before it can
be
identified.
2. A miracle is identified in only one of two
ways—either
as an unusual event in nature, or as an exception to
nature.
3. But an unusual event in nature is simply a
natural
event, not a miracle.
4. An exception to nature cannot be known (i.e.,
identified) from within nature alone.
5. Therefore, a miracle is not identifiable.
And, of course, what is not identifiable has no
evidential value. It cannot be used to prove the truth of
Christianity.
Response to Flew’s Argument.
Flew’s first premise is solid. We must know what we are looking for
before we can know we have found it. If we cannot define it, then we
cannot be sure we have discovered it. But if we can define an event in
terms of nature, miracles can be reduced to natural events. However,
to define them in terms of a supernatural cause (God) is to presuppose
that God exists. Therefore, miracles cannot be used as an evidence of
God’s existence. The supernaturalist argues in a circle.
Presupposing God’s Existence.
One way to reply to Flew is to claim that arguing in a circle is not
unique to supernaturalists. Naturalists do the same thing.
Antisupernaturalist arguments presuppose naturalism. Thus, it is
necessary to argue in a circle, because all reason is circular (Van
Til, 118). In the final analysis, all thought is grounded in faith.
If a supernaturalist chooses to go this route, the
grounds (or lack of grounds) are just as good as those of the
antisupernaturalist. Certainly naturalists who rule out miracles on
the basis of a faith commitment to naturalism are in no position to
forbid theists from simply believing that God exists and, hence, that
miracles are possible and identifiable. Once the naturalists accept
the privilege of a mere belief basis for naturalism for which they
have no rational or scientific proof, they must allow alternative
worldviews the same opportunity.
Evidence for God’s Existence.
There is, however, another avenue: Theists may first offer rational
justification for belief in God through the cosmological or
teleological arguments. If successful, then they can have earned the
right to define (show the identifiability of) miracles in terms of the
supernatural realm they have reason to think exists. To the degree
that one can give a rational argument for God’s existence, it is not
difficult to circumvent Flew’s criticism that miracles have no
identifiable apologetic value.
(to be continued)
(From the Baker Encyclopedia of Christian
Apologetics, Baker Book House, 1999)
